This paper explores the co-existence of relational and territorial spaces -soft spacesthrough the experiences of EU integration and territorialisation. First, we seek a better understanding of EU integration through an engagement with the literature and research on soft spaces. We propose that EU integration is best understood as involving an interplay between territorial and relational understandings and approaches that vary through time, a variation that can be categorized as involving pooled territoriality, supra-territoriality and non-territoriality. Second, we seek to add to the current research and literature on soft spaces by focusing upon the changing character of soft spaces and their temporalities. We approach these two dimensions through an exploration of two ex-post case studies the development of which typically shows different stages of softening, hardening and of differing degrees of Europeanization. With the focus on Europeanization, the paper concludes with three findings: the new spaces of European territoriality are characterised by, first, temporal dynamics, second, the parallel existence with 'hard' spaces, and, finally, they can be employed as a political tool.
Introduction
Recent debates on the nature of space and scale have explored their social, porous and networked nature (e.g., Thrift, 2004; Amin, 2004; Massey, 2005) and argued for a relational view, highlighting "first, that space is constituted through an infinite set of multilayered interactions; second, that space is understood to contain the potential for multiplicity as an expression of social plurality; and third, that space is recognized as being constantly under construction" (Goodwin, 2012: 2) .
Such perspectives challenge 'territorial' and 'bounded' understandings of space and scale disputing the idea that space can be understood as a 'container' and scales as nested hierarchies of bounded and partitioned spaces (Gualini, 2006) . This 'relational turn' has itself been challenged from a variety of perspectives that seek to highlight the binary and unhelpful nature in which relational and territorial spaces are portrayed. Such a reaction has sought to bring territory 'back in' by rejecting what Jones (2009) refers to as the 'crude caricatures' of relational thinkers that present non-relational thinking as 'static'. There are also an emerging number of studies that seek to explore the nature of spatial governance empirically, drawing upon evolving new forms of spatial governance across different policy sectors.
In seeking to overcome the territory-relational dualism Allen and Cochrane (2010) have explored the nature of spatial and scalar restructuring coming to the conclusion that regional politics draw upon and employ a range of relational networks that stretch beyond regions but are also simultaneously lodged within them. As Cochrane has put it, 'politics in practice still seems to retain a strong territorial focus, or at least territory seems still to provide a significant focus around which a range of political projects are organised' (Cochrane, 2012: 95) . It remains the case, as Goodwin argues, that a lot of practical politics continues to be conducted in, through and against a set of institutions whose jurisdiction is territorially defined (2012: 3). The upshot of such theoretical and empirical challenges to the relational turn is a rebalancing and tempering of the view of space as a collection of networks and flows and scale as a political construction with no pre-ordained hierarchy. According to Painter (2010) territory remains the quintessential state space. More recently there have been attempts to overcome the territorial-relational standoff through the notion of assemblage that broadly concerns how spaces and places are put together whilst retaining their heterogeneity (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011) . Drawing upon Latour among others assemblage thinking argues that places are complex and unique configurations of global and local factors that blur the binary nature of structure and agency, near and far, social and material. The emphasis in assemblage thinking is upon emergence, multiplicity and determinacy leading to the need for 'thick descriptions' of how places, for example, manifest, assemble and reassemble neoliberalism (though for an alternative view see Brenner, et al., 2011: 225) .
Despite this revisionism and welcome engagement with the actual practices of territorial and spatial governance such territory-relational debates have largely been abstract and/or normative and have made few inroads into policy spaces and disciplines such as spatial development. Within the EU recent studies have highlighted how spatial governance has begun to address the tensions within state-bounded territorial and relational networked governance through the emergence of new spaces such as the Baltic Sea Region (Stead, 2011) . These new spaces provide a 'spatial fix' that straddle the need to provide legally enabled and democratically accountable territorially linked plans and strategies in ways that also reflect the complex relational world of multiple, networked spaces. Within the EU there is also another driver of new spaces. Spatial planning across Europe is itself reflective of the tensions between nation-state territoriality and EU territorial cohesion objectives. A range of different territorial strategies of the EU have emerged each influencing the nature of territorial/spatial governance. It is also clear that EU integration differs between sectors as well as through time leading to a complex and evolving set of tensions and new spaces (Dühr, 2009; Faludi, 2003 Faludi, , 2010b . Spatial planning as an activity facilitates such spatial reconfiguration simultaneously embracing relational understandings and approaches while acting within territorially defined and legally sanctioned spaces. This duality requires planning to think and act in different realms of space, engaging with the global, national, regional and bespoke, functional spaces yet working through other, often more stable and accountable spaces.
Such theoretical reflections and tensions on the changing nature of EU space and the role of spatial planning have lacked empirical analyses of how, for example, tensions are resolved in contemporary practices of spatial governance. Recent experiences of emerging or new spaces around spatial or development planning might provide a way forward. A number of studies across Europe have highlighted and explored the emergence of so called soft spaces as attempts to create hybrids of territorial and relational spaces (see, for example, Allmendinger and Haughton, 2007; Counsell, et al., 2012; Heley, 2012; Luukkonnen, 2014; Metzger and Schmitt, 2012; Olesen, 2011; Stead, 2011; Waterhout, 2010) . Soft spaces constitute new spaces for development planning that can be relatively enduring or ephemeral, formal or informal, centrally sanctioned or locally driven.
Soft spaces, sometimes accompanied by fuzzy boundaries, provide an opportunity to address mismatches between administrative and functional areas by creating bespoke spaces for dealing with specific issues such as regeneration, integrating different sectors such as transport, infrastructure, education, etc. in such processes operating at variable scales.
Studies of soft spaces have focused upon spatial planning where future strategies and plans for an area have been territorially sanctioned and tethered though relationally connected to issues and influences far beyond. Yet development planning is not the only field or sector where such tensions and possible hybrid solutions arise. This paper explores the coexistence of relational and territorial spaces -soft spaces -through the experiences of EU integration and territorialisation. First, we seek a better understanding of EU integration through an engagement with the literature and research on soft spaces. We propose that EU integration is best understood as involving an interplay between territorial and relational understandings and approaches that vary through time, a variation that can be categorized as involving pooled territoriality, supra-territoriality and non-territoriality. Second, we seek to add to the current research and literature on soft spaces by focusing upon the changing character of soft spaces and their temporalities. Some soft spaces might be very limited in time, others 'harden' towards strongly institutionalized forms, and others remain 'soft' over a long time. We approach these two objectives through an exploration of several EU policy case studies the development of which typically shows different stages of softening, 'hardening' and of differing degrees of Europeanization. This reflection leads, finally, to a proposed research agenda that more thoroughly links territoriality, institutional change and power plays.
Spatial planning, territory and soft spaces
Recent debates on the nature of space and scale and the need to understand geography in relational terms have made some limited though important inroads into planning imaginations and practices (see, for example, Healey, 2006; Graham and Healey, 1999; Davoudi and Strange, 2009 "So whilst planning still needs its clear legal `fix' around set boundaries for formal plans, if it is to reflect the more complex relational world of associational relationships which stretch across a range of geographies, planning also needs to operate through other spaces, and it is these we think of as `soft spaces'" (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009, 619) .
However, it would be misleading to ascribe a single justification to the growing use of soft spaces as evidence suggests that there are a variety of uses and backgrounds Here, soft spaces emerge to challenge or obscure where power actually resides. This point is of particular importance in the context of European integration, as we will detail later.
Fourth, there is an important experimental and political dimension to soft spaces that allows them to be used politically, testing strategies and approaches to an issue without ceding ultimate authority. If successful then such spaces can 'harden' (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012) or disappear if their function has been achieved. If not successful then they can be disavowed and dropped . Similarly, soft spaces are often accompanied by 'fuzzy boundaries' that attempt to insert new agendas, challenge existing identities and territorial representations but with a degree of uncertainty over the issues and actions to be addressed (Haughton et al., 2009; Healey, 2012) . According to Luukonen (2014, 14) European spatial planning thus "forms an informal networked space of Europeanization" and therefore "enables its articulation in terms of common 'European space' or the 'EU territory'."
What we are concerned about more in this paper is how such soft spaces can emerge and be deployed to address, challenge and 'open up' difficult and politically sensitive issues around identity and territory and spatial imaginaries, particularly with regards to European integration and how spatial planning and governance is being used as a means through which reterritorialisation at the macro-regional scale is being managed.
Soft spaces emerged as a response to tensions around territorial and relational space in spatial planning. However, such tensions are not unique to planning contexts; they are found in other sectors and areas of governance, and are most notably a component of European integration. Questions of territorial and relational space in the context of European integration are highly complex and sensitive for two main reasons. First, the polity of European integration is characterised by a tension between nation state territoriality and some supranational mandates on the EU level. Second, we see a high heterogeneity on the policy level. In some policy fields -like the environmental policy or the European Single
Market -we can identify clearly supranational features; in others -in particular in the field of spatial planning -there are no transposed mandates. In both contexts, soft spaces have emerged to handle certain complex, cross-territorial and asymmetric situations or they are used as a tool in strategic ambitions about competence 'gaining and keeping'.
To start with the polity dimension: Despite the strength of some EU supranational competences, the EU's territoriality cannot simply be understood as a parallel to the Westphalian State territoriality or as a superstate. Instead, we see a hybrid setting of a few hard elements (in particular with regard to external border control) and predominating soft elements. Many authors understand this as a predominating intergovernmental organisation of a 'pooled territory' (Mammadouh, 2001; Pullano, 2009; Bialasiewicz. et al., 2005) . The
European citizenship is a good example as it exclusively relies on the national affiliation of individuals: one has to belong to a nation state before they can be considered as EU citizen.
Others stress the 'soft' territorial character of EU integration as "aspirational in terms of a space of values and an area of solidarity" that should not be captured in a clear territorial way (Scott & van Houtum, 2009: 271, 273 Faludi, 2010b) . In the meantime, the EU commission has published a Green Book that has posed questions to stakeholders and member states on how to concretise the objective of territorial cohesion. The public consultation process has brought much inspiration, but little clarity (cp. COM, 2009). In other policy fields we see explicit
European mandates that are highly relevant from a territorial perspective, but which are not coordinated in a territorial, European way -the Common Agriculture Policy or the Transeuropean Networks are just two examples in this respect (see Dammers and Evers, 2008) . This setting has to be understood from a multi-level perspective, e.g., EU financial support can prioritise certain objectives whilst on the polity level, the autonomy of national, regional and local authorities can be limited by European regulation. However, initiatives of national, regional and local bodies can also draw upon European funding and regulation to help deliver the 'by-passing' domestic opponents (see Clark and Jones, 2009; Radaelli, 2003; Böhme and Waterhout, 2008) .
Against this background, Deas and Lord (2006) identified a growing number of 'unusual' or non-standard regions around cooperative arrangements established by INTERREG and other programmes highlighting the tensions between national and regional territory and the European motor of spatial integration and policy (Faludi, 2009 and Metzger, 2012; Knieling, 2011; Stead, 2011) .
One way to capture the emergence, use and fissiparous nature of soft spaces of EU integration is to propose an analytical framework against which to compare and contrast the reality of practices. In order to understand political processes and dynamics, including hidden agendas, actor coalitions etc., we have to consider a differentiated system of territorial categories. This is particularly the case given the logic of integration underpinning the European Union as a construction 'sui generis', without archetype and without predictable outcomes.
In the following parts of the paper we discuss the Europeanization of territoriality and what role soft spaces play in our understanding of this process. Our analytical framework is based upon three territoriality categories that provide a heuristic against which to compare the concrete case studies of the Europeanization of territory that follow.
The first category we label as 'non-territoriality'. Non-territoriality is relevant if there is no formal mandate for a political task with regard to spatial development. In practice this means that a mandate for a certain policy field at the EU level does not exist, is not addressed or is neglected. Thus, as long as no formal EU mandate exists, EU territoriality cannot take effect. Fiscal policy is a typical example as the nation states apply their own rules within their territory. Of course, differences in fiscal regulations are highly relevant for spatial development (e.g. commuting in border regions), but this form of spatiality does not question the political principle of national territoriality.
As The third category we label as 'supra-territoriality' capturing those cases where the political mandate and power is located on the EU level, overriding (inter-)national mandates. The supra-national organisation of mandates initiates a supra-national territoriality and can limit national sovereignty. The European Single market serves as an example: thousands of technical regulations have to be considered which are linked with juridical sanctions which can be enforced by the European Court of Justice (e. g. interdiction of certain customs, mandatory public procurement procedures). This refers to the second meta-theory of European integration, (neo-) functionalism that assumes that in the long run European integration necessarily leads to evermore integration and in the end to the supranational state.
This threefold classification provides a framework for the different territorial dimensions of EU integration though there is a further dimension that needs to be included. Analyses within spatial development highlight the dynamic nature of soft spaces as they evolve to take on new dimensions and characteristics (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009; Haughton and Allmendinger, 2010) . Such evolution reflects the flexible and ephemeral nature of such hybrid spaces as a result of changes in their policy scope (e.g., the inclusion or exclusion of transport and environmental issues) or territorial domain. In other words there is a temporal dimension over which territoriality evolves including future trajectories and possibilities. A policy's reorganization can mean the shift from one kind of territoriality to another. The 'upward' dynamic is fuelled by the transposition of political mandates. The downwards dynamic can be triggered by the retrieval of political mandates. This latter development must be regarded is exceptional but discussions around the future of the Euro illustrate this:
the Euro states could agree to withdraw from the common currency -either to nonterritoriality with the renationalisation of the currencies or to a pooled territoriality based on currency peg. Both directions, either upwards or downwards, are forms of reterritorialisation.
From the analytical to the empirical
The following two case studies are explorative empirical arguments that aim to illustrate and test the framework developed above. The engagement between the analytical and experiences are based on the involvement of the authors in a series of research projects related more or less directly to the questions addressed here. We draw upon two experiences of the Europeanization of territory -the Habitats Directive (HD) and Macro Regional Strategies (MRS). We have chosen these case studies in order to cover the wide range of current constellations in Europeanised territoriality: They involve territorial questions of formally institutionalised policies (HD) and more informal ones (MRS); they cover political processes of quite a long period (HD since the 1980s) and very recent ones (MRS for less than a decade); they involve the EU/EC without originally having explicit mandates (HD) and the EU as coordinator explicitly invited by national authorities (MRS).
The two case studies at hand enable us to explore the temporalities of territoriality in two very different cases. Both cases are examples of new, provocative soft spaces that challenge and reterritorialise areas and perimeters.
1 Habitats' Directive
The Habitats Directive is the main basis of EU nature conservation policy and is the legal basis for the protection of fauna, flora, and habitats in all EU member states. The Habitats Directive was enacted in 1992, after considerable political bargaining. Today, more than 10 % of the European territory is protected by the Directive's regime that unfolds relatively strong consequences in spatial planning and territorial development (Alphandéry and Fortier, 2001; Chilla, 2005; Gibbs, et al., 2007) .
The starting point of this policy tool lies in the late 1980s when dissatisfaction with political power constellations was felt in two groups -within the European Commission and from protagonists of environmental policy. Firstly, within the European Commission there was a strong ambition for more supranational competences in the field of nature conservation, where EU competence was absent with the exception of the Birds Directive from 1979 that had shown hardly any effect until the 1990s. Environmental, policy specific motivations certainly played their role, but given the rotation logic of the personnel within the Commission, the policy specific ambitions were completed by general political power questions and polity concerns.
Secondly, on the national and regional level throughout Europe many policy experts on the fields of the environment felt a certain frustration about environmental policy in general.
Despite a considerable degree of institutionalization of environmental and nature conservation policy, the effectiveness in concrete planning conflicts was seen to be rather weak. In the course of the political bargaining on the Habitats' Directive, these both groups got together within a structural coalition, by-passing the resisting powers mainly on the national level.
This coalition turned out to be effective. The first phase of policy formulation was characterized by a deterritorialisation strategy. Within the official discourse, spatial differentiation was largely absent. Discursive references to the pan-European heritage remained diffuse from a territorial point of view. In background negotiations, it was not easy to convince sceptical member states to adapt the competence transfer -and here 'territorial othering' came into play: For example, Germany was persuaded to support the directive with the argument that there would be few consequences for the country well known for its high environmental ambitions. It was argued that the intention was to upgrade nature conservation policies of the -at that time -new southern European member states (the so called 'club med' considered to have limited ambitions in environmental policy; see Chilla, 2005) . From a juridical point of view, this argument was meaningless, but it was politically effective.
In parallel, the institutional setting was institutionalised through the directive, in parts somehow hidden in its annexes that comprise long lists of species to be protected throughout Europe, regardless the territorial belonging (HD Annex I -V). Moreover, biogeographical regions were installed (HD Art. 1 c iii). However, the procedural regulations remained unclear at that time and member states were unaware of the juridical meaning of the long appendices of the directive. In this sense, the policy formulation can be seen as a discursive deterritorialisation. This phase can be interpreted as 'deterritorialised biology':
biological arguments of nature conservation were put forward, detached from their (bio-) geographical meaning.
After the adoption of the Directive in 1992, the implementation process only started slowly, as the national adaptation came along with delays in most countries. In the years after, more and more conflicts came up, in particular between environmental/biological arguments on the Commission side, supported by ENGOs from all levels, and the non-environmental arguments from sub-national levels like regional planning authorities or national economic lobbying. This is where the second phase started that we consider as reterritorialisation phase. The prescriptions of the Habitats Directive were taken very seriously, and the hitherto soft elements unfold surprisingly efficient consequences: this is particularly true for site selection processes where the protection of the annexes' species turned out to be juridically (Dubois, et. al, 2009 , Samecki, 2009 ). Macro-regional strategies were developed as intergovernmental initiatives aimed at reinforcing international cooperation. Within the Baltic Sea Region the idea for the development of a joint macro-regional strategy arose in 2005. In the course of a changing geopolitical configuration after the EU Eastern enlargement and an increasing eutrophication of the Baltic Sea an interregional working group of the European Parliament took up the idea for a strategic cooperation (Schymik, 2011 , Antola, 2009 ). In 2007, an 'experimental' phase of macro-regions started, when the European Commission was mandated to develop the first macro-regional strategy in order to set new impulses to the already existing institutional setting (see Fig. 2 ).
The institutionalisation process in the Baltic Area was surprisingly quick: due to the priorities of several EU presidencies the European Parliament adopted the strategy in 2009. Several stakeholder groups strongly supported the development of macro-regions for different reasons. Two inducements played an important role for the stakeholders: Many stakeholders were not satisfied with the setting of cross-border and transnational cooperation (e.g. water purification control). There was a search "for a spatial or territorial framework for these policies to fit into" (Faludi, 2010c, 6) . Policy makers on the national and EU levels expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing instruments and complained about missing instruments for joint actions within their geographical focus. The European Commission, more explicitly the Directorate General for Regional Policy, had shown signs of frustration considering the output of regional policies and had difficulties to successfully compete for competences in internal power plays. National representatives were unsatisfied with the international cooperation perimeters available and at the subnational level particularly private stakeholders and project partners missed recognition and political support for long-term actions (Sielker, 2012) .
At this stage, the pooled territoriality principle is applied as national and regional representatives developed the strategies within their respective mandates. Supranational elements can be seen in the Commission's role preparing the consultation process and the Parliamentarian adoption. Summarizing the first phase macro-regions can be termed as "soft spaces" that were developed between different layers of decision-making. The official literature stresses the bottom-up element in the establishment process (CEC, 2010) . It is true that the initiative started at the member state level, but the strong role in coordinating the establishment process must not be underestimated. During the phase of implementation the national representatives, however, gained importance.
Following the idea of the first macro-regional strategy tremendous political interest in this new tool arose on the national level -in most cases for the reason of policy influence (e. g.
shipping, harbour infrastructure) and on the EU level in particular for the reason of integration challenges with regard to new member states. The Baltic Sea Region Strategy triggered a macro-regional 'hype' as many regions debate their own potential in this respective (Dühr, 2011 , Bialiasewicz, 2013 . In the early phase the so called three 'nos' -postulating the absence of (1) financial, (2) institutional and (3) legislative changesunderline the political sensitivity of macro-regions (Schneidewind, 2011).
Macro-regions are implemented through multilateral committees that sit alongside formal institutions and operate within existing frameworks (Sielker, 2012 (Sielker 2012) . Within the different actions in each priority area, a multitude of actor constellations and different geographical boundaries can be relevant (Stead, 2011, 165) . The macro-regions also include 'hard' elements, as the goals agreed upon in Steering
Groups have to be decided and implemented by e. g. national ministries or other committees of funding schemes. During the preparation and implementation process a "growing readiness for 'soft' reforms is evident" (Schymik, 2011: 6) . The macro-regional concept has shown first signs of 'hardening'" (Metzger and Schmitt, 2012) aim at an increasing policy influence in informal networks. All three stakeholder groups, however, seem to be able to address their needs through a gradual reterritorialisation process.
We expect the 'macro-regional era' to continue, though the development paths of macroregions in Europe are not exactly foreseeable -and might vary between the regions (e. g.
speed of development, degree of institutionalisation, topics addressed, etc.). One development path could be a 'supranationalisation' where macro-regional strategies are first steps of a rescaling process towards a supranational level where competences will be allocated to (Stead, 2011 , Faludi, 2010 , Metzger and Schmitt, 2012 , Welz and Engel, 1993 . A second, very likely, scenario is the continuation of macro-regions to 'intergovernmental super-regions' coming along with a further allocation of resources. In the coming years, the scope for assigning further competences to the macro-regional framework would not imply As soon as the strategy is efficient, new perimeters, new agendas and new actor constellations occur. In parallel, soft spaces can 'harden' (MRS as Interreg perimeter) and/or they lose their political relevance (biogeographical spaces today as only technical reference).
In the case of nature conservation policy, the strategy has turned out to be efficient; in the case of the macroregional strategy, the 'success' is not yet finally to be seen, but there are clear signs that macroregional strategies are unlikely to vanish from the political agenda again.
The two explorative case studies here indicate that soft spaces can be very efficient instruments with regard to power plays and ambitions for competence transfer in the context of European integration. In that sense, our examples highlight the complex, evolving and contested nature of reterritorialisation of European space and how such new spaces can unsettle, challenge and disrupt existing, national territorial spaces.
Summarizing the two presented case studies we can identify three perspectives that are crucial for the understanding of soft spaces in the context of European integration: the new spaces of European territoriality are characterised by, first, temporal dynamics, second, the parallel existence with 'hard' spaces, and, finally, they can be employed as a political tool:
Firstly, soft spaces are very much characterized by temporalities due to the dynamic political development. As we saw at the example of the Macro regions, at a certain point of the political process the softness of the early years can harden, but this hardening can turn into softening again. It is important to note that there is no automatic logic of hardening and no one way dynamic: soft spaces are object to political negotiations with an open end -they are part of contemporary reterritorialisation processes.
Secondly, we see a persisting parallelism of 'hard' and 'soft' spaces also in the context of European integration. The example of the macro-regions demonstrates that an intense debate on soft spaces does not necessarily modify or weaken the hard spaces of domestic planning. The territorial and relational features of such new spaces can coexist and develop dynamically. This is particularly true for phases of 'opening up' when the relational features get more prominent. As we see it in the case of the biogeographical regions -there is a process of 'closing down' when soft spaces undergo a process of hardening.
Finally, soft spaces are not only an outcome of political processes but they can also be employed as a political tool, be it intentionally or not. They can be an efficient element in political bargaining of political competences and power.
This paper has presented a heuristic on the basis of ex-post case study analyses. Obviously, further empirical testing has to be the next step, taking an in-vivo-perspective in contemporary processes of reterritorialisation. We feel that a focus upon the significance and import of existing and emerging new spaces of planning would be fruitful, highlighting how European reterritorialisation is impacting upon the outcomes, or not, of national and sub-national competences and spatial planning. Such processes may help explain some of the role of new spaces in national political displacement and disruption.
